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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Thiokol marshalled the evidence, and showed

that in spite of such heavy evidence, the court's Findings were
clearly erroneous.
2.

Whether, contrary to Thiokol's claim that the court

used tort-based principles of fault in its decision, the trial
court correctly applied contract principles in determining the
case, as indicated in the Findings of Fact.
3.

Whether the trial court correctly found that a new

contract was formed between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures for
the reparations of the tanks, regardless of whether the new
contract is styled a modification or novation.
4.

Whether Thiokol, in accepting the repaired tanks, knew

or should have known that they may be defective, waived any
defects in the tanks, and obtained what they specified.
5.

Whether the trial court correctly found that this was a

contract case, disregarding Thiokol's non-independent, noncontractual theories of recovery.
6.

Whether Thiokol waived any right to claims by reason of

their substantial modifications after acceptance.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.

The trial

court's interpretation of the contract is a question of law.
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court finds facts
respecting the intentions of the parties, the viewing Court must
review the evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable
to the findings of the trial court.

Kimball v. Campbell, 699

P.2d 714 (Utah 1985).
To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of the
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshall
the evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient.

Findings of fact will not be

set aside unless clearly erroneous.

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha

Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).
The trial court's judgment may be sustained on grounds
different from those relied upon by the trial court.

Global

Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a contract case.

The facts cited by Thiokol are but

part of the factual basis for the trial court's decision.
In 1988, Interwest Construction (hereafter "Interwest")
contracted with Thiokol Corporation (hereafter "Thiokol") to
construct a waste water treatment facility, M705, for Thiokol

2

(Exhs. 35 and 36J.1

Interwest entered into a subcontract with

A. H. Palmer & Sons (hereafter "Palmer") for the mechanical
portion of M705 (Exh. 37). Palmer's subcontract included three
(3) waste water storage tanks for $90,000.00.
Palmer, unable to use local subcontractors, contracted with
Fiberglass Structures to build the three tanks (Exh. 2). Palmer's purchase order required Fiberglass Structures to build the
tanks according to Thiokol's plans and specifications.
Thiokol's specifications and approvals contained the following pertinent requirements:
1. A minimum wall thickness of 1/4" (Tr 1928) (Exhs. 7, 8,
9, 144).
2.

The fill and empty cycling of the tanks would be by

gravity flow from tanks T5, T6, T7 and T8 situated inside Building 705.

These tanks were smaller tanks than the 35,300 gallon

outside storage tanks. When desired, the 2Jt pipes connecting the
storage tanks would allow them to slowly seek the level of the
inside tanks (Tr 1946, Tr 148-149).2
Because the inside tanks and the storage tanks were the same
elevation (Tr 181), it was impossible to fill T32, T33 and T34
tanks completely if operated in accordance with the plans and
specifications (Tr 1946, 148, 337, 377).

1

"Exh." refers to trial exhibits. nRn refers to the record. "Tr* refers to the transcript of trial
testimony: "DepP refers to depositions used as evidence.
2

Because the tanks could not be filled, the hoop stresses cited by Thiokol could not be
achieved. Therefore, the safety factors based upon hoop stress cited by Thiokol experts are inaccurate.

3

3.

Operation was specified at ambient air pressure.

The

clear meaning thereof is that the tanks would not be subject
either to positive or negative pressures during their operation.
Expert witnesses testified that had the tanks been used as
contemplated by the plans and specifications, the tanks as
manufactured would have been serviceable (Tr 2132-33).
Pre-fabricated vertical panels of the tanks were shipped by
Fiberglass Structures, bolted together, and bolted to the concrete floor in a specially formed keyway (Tr 1935).

The top was

bolted to the sides and fill pipes connected.
Upon completion, on April 30, 1989, tank T34 burst during a
trial test.

The reason for the failure was a design error by

Fiberglass Structures in the joint connecting the vertical
sections (Tr 1934).

Fiberglass Structures admitted fault (Tr

1936), and suggested to Thiokol a method of repair (Tr 1936).
On May 2, 1989, Thiokol inspected the plant, notified
Interwest that it was "substantially complete," and accepted the
work of Interwest and its subcontractors (Exhs. 45, 167).
Thiokol then sent a letter to the contractor complimenting it on
it's completion (Exh. 48). According to Thiokol's project
engineer, Gene Gladys, the contract was complete except for a
punch list of a few small items (Gladys Dep. pp. 132-33, 211-12;
Tr 674-75, 1482, 1748-49).

The fix of the tanks was not part of

the small items left to complete the original contract (Gladys
Dep. pp. 135-136; Tr 1749).

4

Thiokol undertook direct negotiations with Fiberglass
Structures in the approval, engineering, and supervision of the
repair of tanks 32, 33 and 34, after the initial failure (Findings of Fact, paras, 11, 12; Exhs. 13, 15, 148, 149; Tr 681, 670,
1745-48, 1549, 1472, 1550-51, 1748, 1751-52, 1872).
The tanks were reinforced as directed by Thiokol, along the
failed vertical joints and not along the center portions of each
side-wall panel (Tr 1936-38, 1854-55, 1862, 1868).
Sometime after June 18, 1989, Thiokol, without the knowledge
of Interwest, Palmer or Fiberglass Structures, modified the tanks
from gravity fill, as designed and specified, to pressure fill
(Tr 147, 2083, 1285, 1304).

The addition of the pumps was a

major change to the system (Tr 1307, 1765, 1775, 1946; Exh. 18).
Thiokol's change from gravity fill, ambient pressure, to
pumping, using high volume pumps, was in violation of the guarantee given by Fiberglass Structures to Thiokol (Exhs. 36, 18; Tr
1946).
Building M705 was operated by a semi-automated system
involving complex instrumentation.

The operation board was

called a Nemitron (Exh. 304). The pumping modification by
Thiokol included the addition of two double diaphragm pumps
plumbed parallel into a 4" manifold leading to each of the three
tanks.

The pumps were manually operated through manual valves

which lacked any instrumentation (Tr 147, 2083).
Thiokol's modified pump system filled the tanks through the
center of the top of each tank by a 4" pipe (Tr 1332, Tr 151).
5

Thiokol's Exh. 304 reveals that many times prior to the failure
of T33 on August 24th, the tanks were filled by the pumps to
capacity.

The testimony of the employees indicates that by the

pumps the tanks sometimes overflowed, and Thiokol employees had
to clean up the spill (Tr 281-82).
In the early morning hours of August 24, 1989, T33 ruptured,
spilling its contents into the containment area.

The Thiokol

employees testified that immediately prior to the rupture, the
pumps were running, filling tank T33 (Tr 154). However, the same
employees claimed they turned the pumps off.

Exh. 304 shows

waste water moving from the inside of tank T5 to T33 at the time
of rupture.

The Nemitron printout shows that at 5:18 on August

4th, T33 contained 29,206 gallons of water (Exh. 304). Thirty
minutes latesr at 5:48, T33 had filled by more than 3,000 gallons
to 32,148 gallons.
before 6:18 a.m.

The tank burst some time after 5:48 a.m. and

The Nemitron shows that T5 continued to empty

after the tank burst indicating that the pumps were running at
the time T33 ruptured (Exh. 304; Tr 170-3, 238-41, 318). A
Thiokol employee, admitted that he stated in his deposition that
he turned the pumps off one hour prior to the rupture.

However,

he testified in court he turned the pumps off only minutes before
the rupture (Tr 318). Rysgaard was told by Thiokol that the
pumps were running at the time of T33's rupture (Tr 1959).

The

trial court found that the tanks had been overfilling for some
time prior to the rupture (Memorandum Decision p. 5; Findings of
Fact, paras. 27, 28). The operation of the pumps created an
6

uplifting force of approximately 17,000 pounds (Tr 2136-38, 60405).

The tanks were neither designed nor built for such loads

(Tr 1946-50).

Failure would not have occurred had the tanks been

filled by gravity flow as designed (Tr 1951).
After the tank ruptured Thiokol revealed, for the first
time, the pumping modifications to the tanks (Tr 1942, 1285).
Modifications to the tank, by Thiokol, violated the express
warranty given to Thiokol by Fiberglass Structures (Exhs. 18-36),
and caused Val Palmer of Palmer to deny liability (Tr 1303-50).
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision (Appendix A) found as
follows:
The reason for the failure of T33 has not been demonstrated to this court's satisfaction to be a result of
non-compliance by the defendants with the terms and
provisions of the contract. (p. 2) The overhead
filling method, did, however, allow for overfilling of
the tank which the court finds was the most likely
cause of the failure and such overfilling would not
have occurred had the gravity feed system remained in
place. (p. 5)
In this connection testimony is persuasive to this
Court that the most effective likely cause of the
failure was the overfilling of the tank causing uplift
which the tank was not designed to withstand, (p. 5)
Lack of use of negligence language by the court.

Thiokol's

Statement of Facts and other portions of their brief contain
language relating to "negligence" which was never used by the
trial court in its Memorandum Decision nor in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

These statements by Thiokol are not

supportable by the facts or the record.

For instance, as a

statement of fact, Thiokol says without citation:
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The trial court accepted that invitation by finding
that Thiokol had negligently prepared its specifications , negligently accepted the fix of T34 and negligently caused the failure of T33.
(Thiokol Br, p. 19).
The statement of fact is a figment of Thiokol's imagination.3
Factual support for Findings of the Court.

Supported by

evidence, the court made and entered a Corrected Memorandum
Decision (Appendix A ) , Third Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (Appendix B) and a Second Amended Judgment (Appendix
C).

Thiokol cited only small portions of the supporting facts.
The following are some of the critical Findings of Fact by

the court and citations to the evidence, disregarded by Thiokol,
supporting those Findings.
1.

THE COURT FOUND THAT AFTER
THIOKOL UNDERTOOK A DIRECT
WITH FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES
T33 AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
para. 11).
A

*

THE INITIAL FAILURE OF T34,
CONTRACTUAL, RELATIONSHIP
FOR THE REPAIR OF T32 AND
OF T34 (Findings of Fact,

The first failure of T34 occurred on April 30,

1989: the original contract was substantially complete before the
refitting of the tanks.

The original contract was declared

substantially complete on May 2, 1989 except for a punch list of
small items. (Exh. 167; Gladys Dep. 132-33, 211-12; TR 674-675,

^Throughout the Statement of Facts Thiokol attempts to insert the word "negligence" where the
Court had not used the word, in an effort to create error by the trial court. The trial court did not use
negligence language in determining a contract case. Negligence language was not used by the court in
its Memorandum Decision and was not repeated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law yet
it is stated as fact in the Thiokol Statement of Facts with such repetition that it leads the reader to
believe that it must have been used by the court and counsel in the trial. Such is not the case.
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1482, 1748-1749).

At that time, the fix of the initial failed

tank had not yet been negotiated, accepted or completed (Tr 1749)
(Gladys Dep. 135-36; Tr 1749).
Jody Wood, administrator for Thiokol testified that the
replacement of the failed tanks was not part of the original
contract (Tr 681-82).

Under the original contract no agreement

was valid without a change order, and no change order covered the
repair (Tr 468-69, 670; Exhs. 34, 35). Wood testified that the
only change order in the original contract was to allow Fiberglass Structures to build the tanks when the original subcontractor could not complete the project (Tr 670-71).
B.

Thiokol sought a direct extended warranty from

Fiberglass Structures.

Under the original contract all parties

were required to provide a one-year warranty (Exh. 4; Tr 175657).

On May 2, 1989, Palmer gave Thiokol a one-year warranty for

all materials installed by Palmer under the original contract
(Exh. 52; Tr 1471-72, 1482, 1746).

In the last ten years Thiokol

had never required more than a one-year warranty from Palmer (Tr
1481-82).

The repair of T34 and the fix to T32 and T33 occurred

after Palmer gave its one-year warranty (Tr 1752).
A one-year warranty is common in the industry (Tr 1735-36).
The extended warranty direct from the manufacturer was highly
unusual and of an uncommon length of time (Tr 1481, 1756).
After the first failure Thiokol hired an independent engineer who recommended that the original tanks be discarded.
ultimately advised Thiokol to get an extended warranty from
9

He

Fiberglass Structures if they decided not to discard the tanks
(Tr 1856-58, 1861, 1864-65).
Thiokol had reservations about attempting to repair the
original tanks, but decided to go ahead if they could get a
warranty direct from the manufacturer (Tr 1752-53).

Wood,

Thiokol's contract administrator, advised getting an extended
warranty directly from Fiberglass Structures (Tr 693).
Dr. Maurice Glasso, Thiokol's expert, would recommend
seeking an extended warranty from the fabricator (Tr 413-14).
Thiokol required Fiberglass Structures to give a three-year
warranty to Thiokol (Gladys Dep. 102-04; Tr 1481, 1490; Exhs. 37,
191, 18). The warranty excluded modifications to the tanks
(Exhs. 37, 191, 18). Thiokol sought no extended warranties from
Palmer or Interwest (Tr 1489).

The extended warranty was Thio-

kol 's requirement and was a matter of contract negotiation
between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures (Tr 1490, 1630).
C.

Thiokol negotiated a new contract with Fiberglass

Structures for the fix of T32, T33 and the remanufacture of T34.
Palmer and Interwest were out of the loop (Findings of Fact,
para. 12). Fiberglass Structures proposed the fix to Thiokol
employees including the project engineer and the chief contract
administrator (Tr 1746, 1551).

Fiberglass Structures negotiated

directly with Thiokol; Palmer was not aware of eill negotiations
(Tr 1745-48; Gladys Dep. 160; Exh. 12, pp. 2-3; Exhs. 13, 15, 74,
100, 148, 149). Palmer made no proposal to fix the tanks (Tr
1550-51).

Palmer had no expertise in determining what fix would
10

work (Tr 1472-73).

Fiberglass Structures and Thiokol had such

experience (Tr 1472-73, 1550-51).

The correspondence concerning

the proposed fix went from Thiokol to Fiberglass Structures and
returned, with Palmer on occasion acting only as a conduit (Exhs.
13, 15, 148 and 149; Tr 1741-42, 1744-46).
of all the negotiations (Tr 1745-48).

Palmer was not aware

For instance, Thiokol hid

from Palmer that Brent Thomas had recommended that Thiokol
discard the tanks, which Thiokol refused to do (Tr 1751-52,
1872).
Thiokol never asked Interwest or Palmer to replace or fix
the tanks after the first failure, according to Thiokol's Jody
Wood (Tr 681-82).

Thiokol's project engineer, initially hesitant

about the fix, checked all calculations and approved the fix (Tr
1551).

Thiokol accepted the fix, and Thiokol's project engineer

gave the go ahead (Tr 1748, 1752).
2.

THE TANKS WERE BUILT TO THIOKOL'S DESIGN. SPECIFICATIONS AND AS SUCH WERE UNDER-DESIGNED, (Findings of
Fact, paras. 23, 24)

Brent Thomas, hired by Thiokol, stated that Thiokol's
specifications for the original tanks were deficient in containing no design criteria, no safety factors, no temperatures nor
operational features (Tr 1845).

Thiokol failed to request coupon

tests or calculations from Fiberglass Structures concerning the
original tanks (Tr 1846).

Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's expert, agreed

that Thiokol's specifications incorporated only the "requirements" of NBS PS15-69 and not any statement, suggestion or
illustrations (Tr 381-82; Exh. 5 ) . He agreed that NBS PS15-69
11

was only applicable to tanks under 12 feet in diameter, but the
tanks were 20 feet in diameter (Exh. 6, Section 3.6.1, p. 9; Tr
386, 424, 1592, 1636-37, 1877-78).

NBS PS15-69 states that it

only applies to standard size tanks, up to twelve feet in diameter (Exhs. 6, 169). See also, Point VI, below.

Glasso admitted

that the specifications don't state a safety factor (Tr 417), nor
strength requirements for woven roving (Tr 418).
Following the failure of T33 on August 24, 1989, Mr. Loveless, an engineer for Thiokol, wrote new specifications for
replacement tanks (Exh. 506). These specifications were drafted
to prevent cimbiguities or misunderstandings in the original specs
and to ensure Thiokol would get a good product (Tr 846, 848-49,
851-53 and 859-60).

The differences between the* new specifica-

tions (Exh. 506) and the old specifications (Exh. 183) clearly
illustrate that the original tanks were under-d€*signed by Thiokol
and that the original specifications resulted in just what
Thiokol received.
The new specifications contained the following new or
additional requirements:
(1)

Required testing of the resin content of the tanks

to insure a valid product (Tr 851-52).
(2)
856).

One-hundred mile an hour wind specifications (Tr

The original specs required less than building code

requirements.
(3)

The lid with enough strength to hold the snow load

plus one mem to remove the snow (Tr 856).
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(4) Ability to withstand a positive and negative
internal pressure because of added pumps (Tr 858-59).

The

original tanks were to be at ambient air pressure.
(5) An increased temperature range (Tr 860).
(6) A broader range of PH requirements (Tr 864).
(7) A .538 inch wall thickness, more than double that
earlier approved by Thiokol (Tr 865; Exhs. 7, 8, 144).
(8) An SPI report never mentioned in the original
contract (Tr 865).
(9) Much emphasis on better design and control of the
product (Tr 1613, 1614, 1615, 1618, 1619# 1620).
(10) Drawings, calculations and tests (Tr 850).
3.
THIOKOL FAILED TO PROVE THE REASON FOR THE FAILURE OF
T33 ON AUGDST 24. 1989. (Findings of Fact, paras. 19, 21)
A.
collapse.

Thiokolys experts failed to prove the cause of the

Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's main expert, admitted he could

not determine what caused the failure (Tr 448).

He was only able

to see one edge of the failure and would need to see the complimentary edge to determine the cause (Tr 356-57).

He was, at

most, "suspicious" that the lack of sufficient overlap may have
caused the problem,

but could not state any cause with reason-

able probability (Tr 356).

Dr. Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulics

expert, testified that if the side-walls of the tanks were three
times as strong as the expected hoop stress of 3,000 psi, he
could not account for the failure (Tr 2132-33).
were that strong.

See C , below, at 15.
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The side-walls

B.

The lack of overlap was not proven to be the cause

of the collapse (Findings of Fact, paras. 20, 21). Mr. Youngkeit, Thiokol's in house failure analyst, stated that the tank
failure probably began at the bottom of the tank (Tr 482). He
found 5/8 inch overlap in the woven roving along the break high
towards the top, however, he didn't study the full length of the
failure area (Tr 484), because he didn't save that critical
portion of the tank (Tr 490-91).
After the August failure of T33, Thiokol performed tests to
determine the sidewall strength.
were pulled apart.

Samples, shaped like dog bones,

The samples did not fail at the overlap, but

at mid-panel or mid-cloth (Tr 518-19; Exhs. 329-31).

The dog

bone samples were taken close to the failed area but half way up
the tank (Tr 518-19).
C.

The lack of strength of the side-wall of the tank

was not shown to have caused the collapse.

(Finding of Fact 21)

Mr. Youngkeit, Thiokol's analyst, stated that the tested samples
from the failed tank showed a hoop strength of 11,246 psi (Tr
496, 520, 528). The maximum expected hoop stress at the base of
the tank is 3,180 if the tanks were completely full (Tr 377; Exh.
301).

The tanks were designed to be filled by gravity flow and

thus could never be completely full (Tr 148). Thus the maximum
3,180 psi hoop stress could never be achieved (Tr 377). 10,000
psi would yield a safety factor of 3.15 or greater (Tr 377).
Maurice Glasso indicated that a tank could be built to a safety
factor of 3 but he would expect a good stress analysis (Tr 365).
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Mr, Youngkeit suspected other factors than glass content as the
source of the failure (Tr 499-501).
The actual safety factor may have been more than 5 to 1.
The tanks could only be filled approximately 2/3 full as the
emptying tanks were smaller than the receiving tanks (Tr 1529).
Therefore, the hoop stress at the bottom of a tank would be 2/3
of the hoop stress of a full tank or about 2,000 pounds, yielding
a safety factor of more than 5 to 1, not 3.15 to 1 as suggested
by Thiokol.
D.

Lack of thickness in the glass fabrication was not

shown to be a cause of the failure.

Gene Gladys, Thiokol's

project engineer, placed his stamp of approval on submittals by
Fiberglass Structures showing a .25 inch wall thickness (Exhs. 7,
8, 144). Mr. Youngkeit stated the least thickness he could find
on the failed tank was .246 inches, only 4/1000 less than Thiokol 's approved .25 (Tr 524).

One-quarter inch wall thickness

would be sufficient for 12,000 pounds psi of hoop stress (Tr 36970).

Thiokol's tests indicated wall strengths of 10,000 to

12,000 psi and 15,000 to 22,000 psi, the differences resulting
from the vagaries of the testing, not the strength (Tr 375).
4.
THIOKOL KNEW OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERNS AND NOTWITHSTANDING ACCEPTED THE TANKS. (Findings of Fact, paras. 23, 24
and 25)
A.

Thiokol was warned of significant problems with

the tanks after the first failure and prior to the repair.
Thiokol was advised to discard the tanks. Brent Thomas, an
independent consulting engineer hired by Thiokol to review the
15

tanks after the first failure, warned two representatives of
Thiokol, Eddings and Gladys, that the tanks should be discarded
(Tr 1856-58, 1861, 1864-65; Exhs. 11, 134).
Thomas recommended that Thiokol test the tanks to determine
the side-wall strength and other mechanical properties such as
tensile strength, bending stress, etc. (Tr 1847).

He felt that

the wall thickness was inadequate (Tr 1856-57, 1860, 1865).
Thiokol refused to do the simple test recommended by Thomas (Tr
1847, 1855, 1871).

Gladys, the project engineer, instructed

Thomas to concentrate on the splice plate fix over the narrow
joints (Tr 1865, 1875, 1899, 1904).

Thereafter, Thomas deter-

mined that the fix would make the narrow, vertical joint strong
enough (Tr 1867, 1903-04).

Thomas did not recant his concern

about the inadequacy of the mid-panel, side-wall thickness, nor
his recommendation that the tanks be discarded (TR 1867).

Gladys

stated that Thiokol had other engineers who had serious doubts
about attempting to repair the original tanks (Tr 1553).
Thiokol never gave Thomas information on original manufacture, design, calculations or drawings (Tr 1870-71).
Dr. Eastman, Thiokol's main expert, testified that had he
been Thiokol he would have discarded the tanks (Tr 617).
Many experts were available at Thiokol for testing (Tr 843,
480, 1553).

It is not uncommon in the industry to contract

independent experts to perform tests for Thiokol to decide
whether to keep the tanks (Tr 1594, 1599).
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Dr. Glasso, Thiokol's expert, stated he would not have
approved 1/4" wall thickness which was the thickness specified by
Thiokol (Tr 406). Alan Loveless, a Thiokol engineer, felt that
Thiokol should require a specimen test during the manufacture of
a product as an appropriate way to insure Thiokol obtains a
proper product (Tr 852). Thiokol specified double the side-wall
thickness of the original tanks for the replacement tanks (Exh.
508).
Acoustical emissions tests could have been performed by
Thiokol after the first failure but were not (Tr 1614, 1617).
Thiokol's contract administrator, had definite reservations about
attempting to repair the tanks (Tr 1752).
The facilities engineering department of Thiokol, after
completely reviewing the fix of the tanks and having received
warnings from experts hired by them, accepted the fix by Fiberglass Structures (Tr 691).
Thiokol got what they specified, reviewed and approved with
knowledge and warning (Tr 1654).
B.

Thiokol failed to obtain minimum necessary re-

quirements . Before he would accept the tanks, Dr. Glasso would
want design drawings, calculations, tensile strength and hardness
tests (Tr 406-07), none of which Thiokol sought.
Sophisticated owners require calculations (Tr 1600).
Thiokol did not require or approve calculations from Fiberglass
Structures common to the industry (Tr 1596-97):
(1) No seismic calculations (Tr 1599-1600, 1617-18).
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(2) No wind loading calculations (Tr 1600-01).
Thiokol accepted a wind load less than the minimum required under
the Uniform Building Code (Tr 1620).
(3) No snow calculations (Tr 1601).
(4) No calculations of standard laminate thickness or
strength (Tr 1601, 1607).
perform (Tr 1601-02, 1605).

Thickness calculations are simple to
Test coupons of the manufactured

materials were not required nor tested.

Thiokol either waived,

overlooked or ignored them (Tr 1608, 1621-22).
Thiokol approved a 1/4" wall thickness (Exh. 168; Tr 1606).
Because Fiberglass Structure's manufacturing processes were
novel, so Thiokol should have taken extra precautions to insure
an appropriate product (Tr 1607).

Owners are responsible for

providing inspectors at the manufacturing site and at the assembly site (Tr 1608-09).

The tanks were under-designed and under-

scrutinized by Thiokol (Tr 1622).
C.
work.

Thiokol accepted the subcontractors and their

Thiokol reviewed all submittals of plans and specifica-

tions for equipment on the project and accepted the same (Tr 683,
686, 1737).
(Tr 687).

Thiokol could reject any subcontractor or supplier
Subcontractor lists were provided to and reviewed by

Thiokol (Tr 687), who accepted Fiberglass Structures (Tr 173435).
5.
THE ORIGINAL TANKS DESIGNED FOR GRAVITY FILLING AT
AMBIENT AIR PRESSURE WERE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED BY THIOKOL TO BE
FILLED BY TWO HIGH PRESSURE PUMPS ALLOWING OVER-FILLING. LIKELY
CAUSING THE! FAILURE, (Findings of Fact, paras. 26, 28)
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A.

Over-filling was impossible with the designed

gravity fill system.

The smaller interior tanks T5, T6, T7 and

T8, by gravity, filled the exterior tanks T32, T33 and T34, about
2/3 full at maximum (Tr 1529).
B.

By using the after-installed pumps, Thiokol had

overfilled the tanks (Tr 1491).

Once, Palmer was called to

investigate a "leak," but the pumping had overfilled the tank,
leaving inches of water in the containment area around the tank
(Tr 1565, 1583).

Photographs show white residue on the entire

inside of the tanks (Exhs. 319-31, 334-38).
C.

The overfilling of tanks by Thiokol. using pumps

causing an uplifting force. likely caused the rupture of the tank
on August 24. 1989.

Dr. Paul Tullis, Thiokol's hydraulic expert,

testified that overfilling the tanks would cause an uplifting
force between 7,000 and 28,000 pounds (Tr 2136, 2138).
Dr. Eastman, Thiokol's expert, testified that overfilling
would create 11,000 pounds of uplift (Tr 604-05).

Dr. Glasso,

stated that the failure was not inconsistent with upward pressure
(Tr 357-58).
D.

The tanks were neither designed nor constructed to

withstand an uplifting force.

Failure would not have occurred if

the tank had been filled by gravity (Tr 1957).

Fiberglass

Structures would not have completed its contract had it known
about the intent to install pumps (Tr 1946).

The addition of the

pumps caused a substantial change in the tanks (Tr 1307).
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Val Palmer acknowledged that he would not have consented to
the addition of pumps by Thiokol and that such constituted a
substantial change (Tr 1765).
From all of the above, it is clear that the lower court's
Findings were well supported by the record.

POINT I: THIOKOL HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND SHOW THAT IN SPITE OF THE EVIDENCE THE
COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Rule 52a, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the appellate review of a court's findings of fact. That rule states:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous , and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses•
In Matter of the Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 85 (Utah 1989),
cited by the* court, below, the court held that:
When an appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact, .
. . great deference is given to the trial court's
findings, especially when they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live testimony. (Citations omitted) .
Id. at 886.
In order for this Court to judge whether or not the Findings
of Fact are "clearly erroneous," the plaintiff has a heavy burden
to carry* that is, to marshall the evidence in support of the
Findings and demonstrate that despite this evidence the decision
is clearly erroneous.

In The State v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565

(Utah App. 1989), the court stated:

20

Although Wanda (Appellant) asserts that the court's
findings are not supported by the evidence, she has the
burden to convince this court of her assertion. Her
burden is a heavy one in that she "must marshall the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be xvagainst
the clear weight of the evidence,'' thus making them
vN
clearly erroneous.'' In Re Estate of Bartell, 776
P.2d 85, 86 (Utah 1989, quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, Scharf v. BMG
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1077 (Utah 1985); Harder v.
Condominiums Forrest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 566, n.l. (Parenthetical added).
In Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988), the
court held that, "To mount a successful challenge to the trial
court's findings . . . an appellant must marshall the evidence
supporting the . . . findings."

Id. at 922.

The court held that

because the appellants had "failed to make such a showing in this
case, the trial court's determination (as to that finding) will
not be disturbed." Id. at 922 (Parenthetical added).
In the present case, Thiokol has failed to marshall the
evidence in support of the Findings of Fact and failed to show
that in spite of such evidence, the court's Findings are clearly
erroneous.

Many examples can be cited of the failure to marshall

the evidence, including the following Findings and supporting
facts: 1) Thiokol undertook a direct contractual relationship
with Fiberglass for the repair of the tank (See Facts, above at
8-11); 2) the tanks were built to Thiokol's design specifications
and Thiokol obtained what it designed and specified (See above at
11-13); 3) Thiokol failed to prove the reason for the failure of
the tank (See above at 13-15); 4) lack of overlap was not proven
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to be a cause of the collapse (See above at 14, para. B); 5) lack
of strength was not shown to have been a cause of the collapse
(See above at 14, para. C); 6) lack of thickness of the side-wall
was not shown to be a cause of the failure (See above at 15,
para. D); 7) Thiokol was warned of significant problems with the
tanks which may result in further failures, yet refused to
perform simple tests to confirm the tank integrity, and accepted
the tanks with knowledge of such defects (See above at 15-19); 8)
the original tanks were modified to allow filling through pumps
which resulted in unexpected pressures, including vertical uplift
of several thousand pounds (See above at 19-20); 9) Palmer was
left out of the loop of negotiations over the new project and was
never informed that Thiokol's engineers recommended discarding
the tanks (Tr. 1751-52, 1872); 10) the plans and specifications
did not include a 10 to 1 safety factor (See above at 11-12); 11)
Thiokol approved a one-quarter inch wall thickness which requirement was met by the manufacturers (See above at 15, para. D.);
and 12) the most likely cause of the accident was the uplifting
forces which Thiokol's addition of unexpected pumps after the
completion of the contract occasioned (See above at 19-20).
Because Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence, which
Palmer has now been required to do, and because Thiokol has
failed to show that the court's reliance upon all of that evidence is clearly erroneous, the appeal should be dismissed.
Besid€5s failing to marshall the evidence and show the
Findings clearly erroneous, Thiokol has often cited facts sup22

porting its position without mention of the massive contrary
evidence.

In effect, Thiokol is asking this Court to view the

evidence in a light most favorable to its position rather than in
a light most favorable to Palmer, as required.4

POINT II: THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY USED CONTRACT DEFENSE PRINCIPLES SIMILAR TO TORT DEFENSES TO DETERMINE THAT RESPONDENTS HERE
NOT AT FAULT.
A.

Assumption of Risk includes three concepts, one in tort,

one in contract.

Even the tort aspect is a defense in contract.

Somehow Thiokol asserts that the lower court, in finding that
Thiokol "knew or should have known" of the defective condition,
was improperly applying tort principles in contract (Thiokol Br.
at 23).

The court did use contract principles.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that tort defenses,
such as the former assumption of risk, apply in contract.

In

Jacob Constr. v. Structo-Lite Eng. Co., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980),
the court considered facts very similar to those at bar. Subcontractors had created allegedly faulty storage tanks.

In this

pre-Beck case5, the trial court had submitted both tort and
contract claims to the jury.

The court held that assumption of

risk involved three legal concepts, one in contract and one in

4

The Court should note that, in contrast, Palmer does not rely solely on its own evidence, but
often cites to Thiokol's own experts and consultants to show how favorable the evidence was. See, e.g.
references to testimony of Gladys, Glasso, Eastman, Youngkeit, and Wood.
See Point III, below, concerning the Beck case and the appropriateness of contract rather
than tort principles applying.
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tort, "a mere* phase of contributory negligence."

Even the latter

tort concept would apply in contract:
• . • [S]ince the jury was instructed that the damages
resulting from the breach of warranty were the same as
for negligence, the finding of assumption of risk
applies equally to both the negligence and the warranty
claims.
Id. at 312 (Emphasis added).

The court described the con-

tract/tort issue, under assumption of risk as:
Whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due
care (a) would have incurred the known risk and (b) if
he would, whether such a person in the light of all of
the circumstances including the appreciated risk would
have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff
acted.
Id. at 310 (Emphasis added).
In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.. 831 P.2d 865 (Utah
1981), another pre-Beck

(See n.5, above) case, the court specif-

ically held that one of the three concepts of assuming a risk is
in contract:
With time it has become clear that the assumption of
risk defense in fact includes at least three different
legal concepts. See Jacobson Construction Co. v.
Structo-Lite, . . . the vprimary express' form involves
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the risk or
danger, . . . Secondary assumption of risk is, as
stated, the unreasonably encountering of a known and
appreciated risk and in reality an aspect of contributory negligence.
Id. at 869-870 (Emphasis added).

The court went on to talk about

"that part of assumption of risk which is an aspect of contributory negligence," implying others are not.

Id.

at 870.

In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 302 (Utah 1971), cited
favorably in Jacobson, above, the court held that assumption of
risk was a defense in breach of warranty contract:
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On the subject of contributory negligence as a defense
to a cause of action based on breach of warranty, the
imminent authority Prosser says:
V

A few decisions have said flatly that it is
not.' [Citing cases]. The great number have
said quite as flatly that it is. [Citing
cases]. * * * Those which have permitted the
defense all have been cases in which the
plaintiff has discovered the defect and the
danger and has proceeded nevertheless to make
use of the product. They represent the form
of contributory negligence which consists of
deliberately and unreasonably proceeding to
encounter a known danger, and overlaps assumption of risk.
Id. at 304-305 (Emphasis in the original).

In that case, the

court held that if the plaintiff had reason to know of the defect
and possible danger and voluntarily accepts it, then that party
cannot recover in contract:
We accept as correct for this purpose: that if the
plaintiff knows of the defect and the danger, but
nevertheless vdeliberately and unreasonably' goes
ahead, he should be precluded from recovery.
Id. at 305.

Specifically speaking of whether that conduct

applies in tort or contract, the court stated: "We further think
that the nicety of terms should not be of controlling importance." Jtd. at 305.

Thiokol tries to rely on such niceties.

In Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah
1981), the court does away with one of the three types of assumption of risk in contributory negligence, leaving its use in
other, e.g. contract cases:
No longer, then, under the rulings of this court, is
Assumption of the risk' to be treated separate from
contributory negligence in comparative negligence
cases.
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Id. at 726.

The Restatement also affirms that a party which

obtains that which is expected should not be able to recover
damages.

Restatement of Contracts, § 344, statess:

Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following
interests of a promisee: (a) vHis expectation interest,' which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain . . ., (b) his vreliance interest,' which
is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract . . . .
Certainly Thiokol's expectation and reliance was that it had
reason to believe it may be getting an inferior product which may
someday fail.

The failure did not damage Thiokol's expectation

or reliance on the contract.

Thiokol got what it bargained for.

Restatement of Contracts, § 346(1) states:
The injured party has a right to damages for a breach
. . . unless the claim for damages has been suspended
or discharged.
In the present case, Thiokol was warned of possible deficiencies in the product, yet accepted the risk.

They were told

that the tanks should be discarded or, at the very least, the
side-wall strength tested, yet Thiokol refused.

They knew that

the side-wall was too thin, and that only the mirrow splice plate
fix over the joint had been certified as structurally sound.
They had concerns about the manufacturer.

All this constituted

knowledgeable assumption of risk properly found by the court.
B.

Waiver is the knowing acceptance of a risk in a con-

tract, and is also sometimes called assumption of risk.
Besides assumption of risk, many courts have indicated that
if a party accepts a defective product or other risk under a
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contract knowing or having reason to believe that the product is
defective, a waiver exists.
In Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1988),
the court considered a contract concerning a defective car which
caught on fire.

The court held that a party can waive rights or

obligations under the contract:
The failure of the parties to adhere to the precise
terms of the contract, combined with the parties'
failure to give any notice of their intention to insist
on strict compliance with the terms of the contract, is
ample evidence to support a finding that the parties
waived strict compliance with the contractual terms.
Citations omitted.
Id. at 98 (Emphasis added).

The court held that waiver can be

implied from accepting performance not in strict compliance with
the terms of the contract:
Waiver can be implied from conduct, such as making
payments or accepting performance which does not comport with contractual requirements. Citations omitted.
Id. at 98 (Emphasis added).
In Foley v. Horton, 780 P.2d 638 (N.M. 1989), the courts
considered a homeowners' allegations of defects in construction.
The court held that for the builders to establish waiver against
the homeowners, the builders would have to show that the homeowners "were aware of the building defects in their home upon
acceptance and took no action, thus arguably waiving their rights
to cure or damages."

Id. at 639 (Emphasis added).

The court

found, however, that the defects were latent.
In Epperson v. Roloff, 719 P.2d 799 (Nev. 1986), the court
considered an alleged breach of contract for sale of a home with
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a defective solar heating system.

The court held that the mere

occupation of the home could not constitute a waiver of contract
without reason to know of a defect:
In order to establish such a waiver, Respondents would
have to establish that the Eppersons (new home owners)
knew or had reason to know that the solar heating
system was defective. Citation omitted.
Id. at 804 (Parenthetical and Emphasis supplied).

The court

indicated that it was a question of fact whether or not the new
homeowners "knew or should have known of the defcsct . . . . • '

Id.

(Emphasis added).
In the present case, and as found by the court, Thiokol knew
or reasonably should have known of any defects in the product.
Thus their acceptance of the product constituted a waiver which
barred their recovery of restitution or damages.
C.

The doctrines of assumption of risk and waiver apply to

strict liability contract cases, and fit this case precisely.
Strict liability does not apply in this case.
VIII, below.

See Point

Even if it did, the Utah Supreme Court has estab-

lished that where a person accepts a possible danger, that person
may not recover in strict liability when the danger materializes.
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah
1979), a pre-Beck (See n.5, above) case on construction6, the
court stated:
When the user of a defective product knows or in the
exercise of ordinary care should know of the defect in
a product and of the danger inherent therein, the

6

See Footnote 1, above.
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doctrine of strict liability in tort should not apply
to harm occurring to the purchaser after such knowledge. (Citation omitted).
Id. at 158.

In Hahn, the court held that the defenses in strict

liability and breach of implied warranty are the same;
[E]ssentially the same analysis for the purpose of
determining defenses to breach of implied warranty
parallels that for strict products liability. Therefore the same defenses discussed under strict products
liability are available under breach of implied warranty.
Id. at 159.

POINT III: THIOKOL'S ALLEGATIONS IN TORT ARE NOT INDEPENDENT OF
THE CONTRACT AND SEPARATELY ACTIONABLE.
A.

Thiokol is not entitled to assert tort claims: the

contractual duties involved give rise only to contractual actions . Thiokol suggests that Respondents should be liable under
tort theories.

Thiokol's Br., Point III.

The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that if parties arrange
rights, duties and obligations under a contract, their cause of
action for breach of those obligations is in contract and not in
tort.

In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah

1985), the court considered whether or not a bad faith action
between an insured and insurance company should be governed by
contract, tort, or both.

In the face of a majority of courts

which turn to tort, fearing that contract law would not provide
sufficient remedies, the Utah Supreme Court held that suits in
contract provide all remedies necessary, and tort concepts are
inappropriate:
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[I]n first-party relationship (between an insurer and
its insured), the obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach
of those implied or express duties can give rise only
to a cause of action in contract, not one in tort.
Id. at 800 (Emphasis added).
Beck does not just apply to insurance contracts.

The court

recognized that the duties in Beck are similar to those "implied
in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives rise to
a claim for breach of contract."

Id. at 798. The court contin-

ued that courts recognizing tort theories have "had difficulty
developing a sound rationale" for treating insurance contracts
differently, that is, in tort, because those courts recognize
that tort theories are not appropriate where non-insurance
contracts are concerned.

The court stated: "There is no sound

theoretical difference between a first party insurance contract
and any othesr contract," jEd. at 800, and:
We further hold that as parties to a contract the
insured and insurer have parallel obligations . . .
obligations that inhere in every contractual relationship.
Id. at 801 (Emphasis added).
Tort is appropriate only where independent acts give rise to
such an action.

In Culp Construction Company v,> Buildmart Mall,

795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990), the trial court had dismissed a tort of
negligent misrepresentation, finding the matter a question of
contract, consistent with Beck.

The Supreme Court reasserted

Beck that acts constituting a breach of contract lie in contract,
but found that the defendant had not only breached the contract,
but also independently represented that he was acting as an
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abstractor.

Therefore, he may be liable in tort for independent

negligent misrepresentation not within the contract.

Thus where

independent acts result in the elements of a tort not within the
contract, then a tort may be alleged.

(See also, discussion of

DCR v. Peak Alarm. below at 32, subpara. 3..)
Although the court in Beck stated that "only" a contract
claim is appropriate, the court recognized that where independent
duties arise, not covered by the contract, a party may also
recover for a breach thereof.

The court used intentional inflic-

tion of emotional distress as an example.

Id. at 800, n.3.

In

the present case, the question thus becomes whether or not
Respondents' tort claims were independent of the contract.
were not.
B.

They

See Subsect. 2, immediately below.
Thiokol's tort allegations are the same as its contract

allegations, not independent.
same - a defective product.

All of Thiokol's claims are the
Thiokol's Cross-claim alleges that

contractual duties were breached because the tanks supplied "were
defective, inadequate, and non-conforming" (R940, para. 4).
Thiokol's alleged damages for breach of contract are stated in
para. 33 of the cross-claim (R940, para. 5).
Thiokol's contract breach of express warranty claims assert
that contracts for warranty (R942-43, paras. 15(a)(b)(d)), were
breached because of "defects in design, manufacture or materials"
(R943, paras. 15(a)(b), 16). Thiokol's alleged damages are the
same, those in para. 33 (R943, para. 17).
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Thiokol's negligence claims assert that the tanks "were
defective in design and manufacture and were totally inadequate
. . ." (R944, para. 20). Thiokol's alleged damages for negligence are the same, those in para. 33 (R944, para. 21).
Thiokol's strict liability claims assert that the tanks were
"in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous . . . "
(R944, para. 25). Thiokol's alleged damages are the same, those
in para. 33 (R945, para. 27).
In both the contract and the tort claims, Thiokol merely
alleges that the parties designed and produced a defective
product.

The contract dealt with providing a good product, thus

all claims arise under the contract.

No independent tort theo-

ries are even alleged.
C.

The above analysis of Thiokol's Complaint also illus-

trates Thiokol's misplaced reliance on DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm,
663 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) (Thiokol's Br. at 22, 46-47).
In DCR, the court examined the plaintiff's complaint and
found a tort allegation independent of the contract, i.e. failure
to warn of a known risk: "Such a duty to warn is nowhere expressed in the parties' contract; . . . " Id. at 434.

The court

held that in an ongoing maintenance contract, the service company
had an independent tort duty to warn.

In the present case, there

was no ongoing maintenance relationship.

Allegations, both tort

and contract, were the same, that is, creating a defective
product.

The contract contemplated a non-defective tank, thus no
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tort is alleged by Thiokol independent of the contract, as in
DCR.
D.

A party which obtained that which it specified should

not be able to later assert higher standards by implying noncontractual theories,
Thiokol's lengthy, detailed specifications set the standards
and parameters for the tanks which they desired.

Experts testi-

fied that Thiokol "got what they specified, reviewed, approved,"
and had installed with regard to the tanks. (Tr 1654:14-18).
Now, because sophisticated Thiokol's standards were not
sufficient for recovery/ Thiokol attempts to impose a higher
standard through tort theories.7
It is axiomatic in contract law that parties, especially
sophisticated parties dealing in special products, can create
their own bargain and are not bound by general implied duties.
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc., 657 P.2d
1279 (Utah 1982), the owner attempted to hold subcontractors to a
higher general manufacturer's duty of care, relying on WRH v.
Econ. Builder's. 633 P.2d 42 (1981).

The court held that even if

WRH establishes a duty of care on a manufacturer, that duty would
not apply where the parties are not supplying goods to unsophisticated purchasers, but rather following the plans, specifications, and directions of a sophisticated purchaser:

See Thiokol's argument that the Respondents had a duty to manufacture the tanks in
accordance with the plans and specifications, onto a higher standard if other contractors may have
done so under other contracts or circumstances. Thiokol's Br., Point II:B.
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Appellants are not Manufacturers' comparable to the
manufacturer in the WRH case. While the latter manufacture products destined for retail sale to unknown
and potentially inexperienced purchasers, appellants
provided their products and services to a presumably
knowledgeable contractor in accord with detailed contract specifications.
Id. at 1286. The court held that the contract specifications,
not general manufacturing duties, set the standards because of
the sophistication of the parties.

See also, Points VII and

VIII, below.
In the present case, sophisticated Thiokol specified the
product they wanted, and they go what they specified.

General

manufacturing duties do not apply.

POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
PARTIES MODIFIED THEIR CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS. (Findings of
Fact, paras. 11, 12, 15)
Thiokol seems to argue that the facts as found by the trial
court do not form the requisites of a modification.

The record

shows an offer by Fiberglass Structures for the fix, negotiations
as to terms and an acceptance by Thiokol.

Thiokol received a new

three-year warranty, negotiated separately and independently from
the original agreement between Thiokol and Interwest (See Facts,
above, at 9-12).

A warranty unusual in the industry and negoti-

ated separately from the usual one-year warranties given by the
parties (See Facts, above, at 9-12).
The facts as found by the trial court support the legal
conclusion that the parties modified the original agreement.
is to be noted here that the Thiokol does not argue that the
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It

parties cannot modify their agreement.

Provo City Corporation v.

Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979) and Ted R. Brown &
Associates Inc. v. Carnes Corporation, 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App.
Ct. 1988).
A.

Thiokol argues that the law requires the breaching

party to attempt to cure.

Palmer does not disagree with the

principle nor the authorities cited.
The first failure occurred on April 30, 1989.
was to be performed by May 1, 1989.

The contract

The time for performance had

expired (Tr 688, Gladys Dep. 227).
Thiokol had two options: (1) require new tanks; or (2) make
an agreement for the fix of the existing tanks.
for the latter.

Thiokol opted

The initial contract was declared substantially

complete on May 2nd and the negotiations for the fix were started
between Thiokol, using Thomas as their expert, and Fiberglass
Structures (Exhs. 45, 134, 135, 1213, 148, 149 and 150). The
trial court properly found that Interwest and Palmer were left
out of the loop (Findings of Fact, para. 12; See Facts, above, at
11-12).
The trial court considered the exhibits showing direct
negotiations (Exhs. 12, 13, 100, 148, 149) and how Thiokol used
their independent expert Dr. Thomas to verify the fix.

Thiokol

directed Thomas to ignore the issue of the side-wall thickness
and concentrate on whether or not the fix, using a splice, would
work (See Facts, above, at 16-18).

Gladys and Wood also ques-

tioned the sidewall strength but opted to approve the fix and
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accept the tanks (Id.).

In a highly unusual procedure not

involving a change order to the original contract, Thiokol
requested directly from Fiberglass Structures a three-year
warranty (See Facts, above, at 9-10).

Palmer hadf prior to this

time, given a one-year warranty for their work performed by them
(Id.).

Thiokol now looked to Fiberglass Structures for satisfac-

tion and not to Interwest (See Facts, above, at 8-11).

Gladys

states that the fix was not a part of the original contract nor
does the fix of the tanks appear as a punch list item for the
completion of the original contract (Id.; Exhs. 140, 163). The
fix is not represented by a change order (id.).

Gladys testified

that the fix was not part of the small items mentioned in the
punch list needed to complete the project (id.; Exh. 163).
The trial court found that the tanks were to be within
specifications after the fix (Finding of Fact 23). Thiokol
accepted the tanks and put them to use.
Thiokol, throughout the trial, and in their brief, ignores
their modifications to the tanks which the trial court found to
be substantial (Finding of Fact 26). The ability to overfill the
tanks most likely caused the failure (Finding of Fact 28).
Thiokol asks for reversal of the trial court decision while never
addressing the issues created by their modifications to the
tanks.

Thiokol claims that the trial court's remedy was "harsh"

(Thiokol Br. p. 41, line 1) while ignoring their installation of
high pressure pumps capable of causing uplifting forces on the
tanks never contemplated by Interwest, Palmer and Fiberglass
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Structures agreements (Tr 1946).

The trial court's decision was

not made in a factual vacuum and Thiokol cannot now ignore its
own conscious decision to use pumps.
B.

Thiokol had contractual remedies with Interwest.

Interwest had contractual remedies with Palmer.

Palmer had

contractual remedies with Fiberglass Structures.

The usual

procedure of change orders proceeding down the chain for approval
was ignored by Thiokol because Thiokol negotiated a new contract
directly with Fiberglass Structures for a fix of the tanks. The
terms were a three-year warranty for the fix.

Interwest and

Palmer gave no three-year warranty (Tr 1238, 1753).

The fix

being a subject of a new contract with warranties, Interwest and
Palmer were no longer concerned, and Thiokol never required
either Interwest or Palmer to attempt the fix.

Thiokol never

rejected the tanks, although advised to the contrary.

Thiokol

contractually waived defects known to Thomas, Gladys and Wood,
accepted the fix, accepted the tanks, and put them to use8.
Thiokol implies that the parties cannot modify a contract by
a new offer, acceptance and consideration, as a remedy to a
difficult situation.

Contract law does not bar a modification by

the parties nor even a novation. (17A CJS §373 et. esq.)

Utah

case law acknowledges the ability of contracting parties to
remedy difficulties by modification.

In this case the modifica-

It is amazing that Thiokol would even consider the installation of pumps after receiving
warnings from Thomas, Wood and Gladys. It could be argued that Thiokol had nothing to lose and
everything to gain if the tanks failed. Their brief seems to reveal their philosophy.
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tion was the agreement between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures
for the fix of a tank, a separate agreement not covered by a
change order to the original contract nor a part of the punch
list of items required to complete the initial agreement.

There

is evidence to support the trial court's Findings and the trial
court can conclude as a matter of law that Thiokol and Fiberglass
Structures modified the initial agreement with the fix and the
three-year warranty(2)9. (See Facts, above, at 8-11).
The trial court found Thiokol got what it bargained for
(Findings of Fact, para. 23). That finding is not challenged by
Thiokol who argues that it "should not be denied the right to
revoke it's acceptance and sue for the breach" (Thiokol Brief p.
42 line 3), but when?

Before or after Thiokol made major sub-

stantial modifications to the tanks?

Thiokol's argument implies

that after it made the modifications it should be allowed to
revoke its acceptance made prior to the modifications and sue for
the breach after the modifications likely caused the failure.

A

novel argument but unrealistic and without legal authority.
C.

Thiokol argues that the attempted cure did not result

in a change of Appellee's contractual obligations (Thiokol Brief
p. 43). Thiokol cites a series of exhibits received by the trial
court.

In citing the exhibits Thiokol ignored other exhibits

which could have been marshalled in support of the finding.

The

ThiokoVs argument is nullified by ThiokoVs addition of the pumps. Whatever agreement
the parties may have had with Fiberglass Structures or for that matter with Interwest and A H.
Palmers when Thiokol installed the pumps they voided all warranties. As the owner, fully aware of
the weaknesses of the tanks, Thiokol and Thiokol alone chose the manner of use or abuse.
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trial court found a modification of the contract through the
introduction of exhibits and a testimony of witnesses (Exhs. 13,
15, 148, 149, 100). (See Facts, above, at 8-11).
Thiokol next claims that Palmer's burden of proof at trial
is clear and convincing (Thiokol Brief p. 44, line 8).

The

burden of proof in contract cases is the preponderance of the
evidence.
There is credible evidence to show that the Interwest's
contract was substantially complete.

The fix was negotiated

between Thiokol and Fiberglass Structures after the substantial
completion of the principle contract10.
In summary* the Findings of Fact of the trial court, unchallenged by Thiokol, evidenced that the tanks, after the fix, were
made to plans and specifications required by Thiokol.

Thiokol's

brief ignores substantial modifications to the tanks. Thiokol's
refusal to deal with this issue renders their arguments moot.

POINT V: ANT AMBIGUITIES IN CONTRACTS OR PARTS THEREOF, SUCH AS
SPECIFICATIONS, SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THIOKOL.
Thiokol alleges that some aspects of trade publications were
incorporated into the specifications of this job by the contract.
Utah law is clear and has long recognized that any ambiguities in
a contract are resolved against the drafter.

See Park Enterpris-

This argument is also moot The fix was negotiated and implemented prior to the
installation of the pumps. The Trial Court found the tanks were built to specifications (Finding of
Fact 23). The addition of the pumps was an election made by Thiokol without notice to any other
party. After all Thiokol was the owner and could deal with their property as they wished, but in so
doing must accept the loss as occasioned by their abuse of the property.
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es v. New Century Realty. 652 P.2d 918, 920, (Utah 1982); Docutel
Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 431 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah
1986), citing Park Enterprises.

Thiokol drafted the contract and

specifications in question.

POINT VT: THE SPECIFICATIONS DID NOT REQUIRE A 10 to 1 SAFETY
FACTOR IN SIDE-WALL STRENGTH, AND EVEN IF IT DID, THE RESULT
WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME.
The specifications incorporated only the "applicable requirements of . . . NBS PS15-69," a technical publication (Exh.
5, para. 2.02(E).
Thiokol argues that NBS PS15-69 "requires" a 10 to 1 safety
factor on side-wall thickness, and if a 10 to 1 factor had been
used the tank would not have failed.
Thiokol's argument fails because: 1) NBS PS15-69 doesn't
apply to tanks of the size in question, 2) a 10 to 1 safety
factor is not a "requirement" of NBS PS15-69, 3) Thiokol never
proved what caused the failure, so a 10 to 1 factor on the sidewall may not have changed failure, and 4) Thiokol specified a
questionable wall thickness of .25" (Exhs. 7, 8, 144).
First, NBS PS15-69 limits its application to standard sizes
and types of tanks:
Product standards are published voluntary standards
that establish (1) dimensional requirements for standard sizes and types of various products, (2) technical
requirements for the product . . .
(Exh. 6 at Introduction).
The only tanks mentioned in NBS PS15-69 are twelve feet in
diameter or less.

The tanks at issue were twenty feet in diame40

ter.

Therefore there are no "applicable" requirements in NBS

PS15-69.
Second, the only reference to a 10 to 1 safety factor in NBS
PS15-69 is in a footnote to a chart which describes characterisLICS

of some smaller fiberglass tanks.

The specific reference

states that the table is "based on a safety factor of 10 to 1, a
liquid specific gravity of 1.2" (Exh. 6 at p. 11). Nothing in
the chart or the footnote "requires" a 10 to 1 safety factor, nor
a specific gravity of 1.2 for liquid contents.

If Thiokol's

argument is correct, all liquids in such tanks would be required
to have a certain specific gravity also.

NBS PS15-69 did not

require tanks to contain only liquids of 1.2 specific gravity.
The lack of a "requirement" is especially apparent when the rest
of NBS PS15-69 is compared, which is replete with statements that
things "shall" be done or are "required."
All Thiokol had to do if they wanted a 10 to 1 safety factor
would be to add a few words to the specs such as "side-wall
strength shall have a 10 to 1 safety factor."

Instead, in spite

of their contract to the contrary, they try to bind the parties
to a non-requirement in a footnote to an inapplicable chart in an
inapplicable publication.
At the least, whether a 10 to 1 safety factor is required is
ambiguous, and therefore construed against Thiokol.

See Point V,

above.
Third, Thiokol didn't prove that the lack of side-wall
strength caused the accident (See Facts, above, at 13-15).
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Uplift forces caused by overfilling breaking loose the bottom of
the tank is the most likely cause (See Facts, above, at 19-20).
All of Thiokol's tests after the second failure showed at least
three times the necessary sidewall strength.
al strength would have had no effect.

Therefore addition-

Glasso testified that once

begun, any tear would act like a zipper and be unstoppable.

POINT VII: BECAUSE THIOKOL CREATED THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS
AND CLOSELY SUPERVISED ALL WORKf ESPECIALLY THE FIXf THE PARTIES
ARE ABSOLVED OF RESPONSIBILITY.
Utah and other law holds that a contractor may rely on the
plans and specifications.

In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley

Dairy Assoc.. 657 P.2d 1279 (1982), an owner claimed defective
manufacture and installation of equipment.

The court held that

the contractor was not responsible if the contractor followed the
plans and specifications of the owner and was closely supervised:
Having contracted directly with Maxum and knowing of
Maxum's close supervision of the entire installation
process, appellants (subcontractors) had reason to
expect that Maxum would protect respondent's interests
by observing and obtaining correction of obvious defects . The trial court correctly found that Maxum bore
a responsibility for correction of such defects.
Id. at 1286 (Parenthetical supplied).

The above-mentioned quote

fits the facts in the present case almost identically.
had all the expertise in the world.

Thiokol

They had two engineers, one

full-time expert in tanks and fiberglass, to closely supervise
the entire installation process.

They and they alone were warned

of the possible weakness in the side-wall, but refused to test
for such weakness.

They alone determined that the splice plate
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fix, which would correct only the joints, would be sufficient.
They alone authorized and supervised the repair work.

Palmer, on

the other hand, had little expertise in the area and relied upon
the fact that Thiokol would act as a responsible party in protecting against known defects or those which Thiokol should have
known in the face of serious warnings.
In Paul Mueller Co., the court went on to distinguish
another case, indicating that where a manufacturer manufactures
products for inexperienced purchasers, the manufacturer may bear
the most responsibility, but when knowledgeable purchasers create
their own plans and specifications and supervise the work, they
are the responsible party:
While the latter (general manufacturer) manufacture
products destined for retail sale to unknown or potentially inexperienced purchasers, appellants provided
their products and services to a presumably knowledgeable contractor in accordance with detailed contract
specifications.
Id. at 1286 (Parenthetical supplied).

Thiokol's specifications

above were exhaustive, aside from lengthy matters incorporated by
reference.

Thiokol was warned of defects.

Therefore Thiokol, as

the sophisticated purchaser, was responsible.
Paul Mueller Co. followed an earlier case, Leininger v.
Steams-Roger Mft. Co., 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965), wherein the
court held that contractors following plans, specifications and
directions are not in the same position as a general manufacturer
supplying goods to the unsophisticated public:
An important limitation on the rule placing building
contractors on the same footing as sellers of goods is
that the contractor is not liable if he has merely
43

carried out the plans, specifications and directions
given to him since in that case the responsibility is
assumed by the employer, . . .
Id. at 36 (Emphasis added)•
In Leininger, the court recognized that if the plans,
specifications and directions were "so obviously dangerous that
no reasonable man would follow them," then the contractor may be
liable.

In the present case, the side-wall thickness as speci-

fied by Thiokol resulted in a 3 to 1 safety factor, disregarding
the pumps added by Thiokol later.

That is not so obviously

dangerous that no reasonable man would have followed them.
Thiokol specified and approved a side-wall thickness resulting in
a 3 to 1 safety factor, if that is less than a usual industry
standard, they should not now complain.

Their own expert said

that a 3 could be used, but he would want good controls (Tr 365),
controls Thiokol failed to require.
Experts testified that Thiokol "got what they specified,
reviewed, approved," and had installed (TR 1654:14-18).

POINT VIII: STRICT LIABILITY DOES NOT APPLY IN A COMMERCIAL
SETTING WHERE THE PURCHASER IS SOPHISTICATED.
Strict liability was developed to allow an unsophisticated
individual consumer to recover from any party in the chain of
manufacture and sale, leaving proportions of fault to those in
the merchandising chain who have the means to litigate.

Thiokol

now attempts to turn the doctrine on its head, arguing that it
applies to Thiokol, a corporation and the most sophisticated of
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all of the parties.

The courts, however, have long disallowed

strict liability for such sophisticated corporations.
In Scandinavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft, 601 F.2d
425 (CA9 1979), the plaintiff airline attempted to recover for
defects in jet engines from the manufacturer.

The court indicat-

ed that protection of defenseless consumers and spreading the
risk was "the fundamental policy" (Id. at 428) behind strict
liability, quoting the California Supreme Court:
Essentially, the paramount policy to be promoted by the
rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims
of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout
society of the cost of compensating them.
Id. at 428. The court found that the manufacturer and the
purchaser were equals in that regard:
[W]hether the loss is thrust initially upon the manufacturer (United) or consumer (SAS), it is ultimately
passed on as a cost of doing business included in the
price of the products of one or the other and thus
spread over a broad commercial stream. (Citations
omitted).
Id. at 428.
The court found that secondary reasons for protecting
defenseless individuals through strict liability also did not
apply:

"The consumer's difficulty in inspecting defects . . . "

(Id. at 428); "the problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence . . . and warranty . . . remedies . . ." (Id. at 429); and
problems of privity.

The court found that the purchaser airlines

"had the expertise and personnel to inspect the engines for
defects." Id. at 429. The airlines also "does not have the lack
of technical knowledge and expertise which would burden members
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of the general public in proving negligence."

There were also no

problems showing privity with the manufacturer.
In the present case, Thiokol had vastly more expertise and
resources and can better spread the risk, Thiokol not only could
inspect the tanks, by contract, but engaged a full-time and a
consulting engineer for that purpose.

Thiokol's project engineer

was familiar with tanks and fiberglass (Gladys, 10:10-13; 11:513; 12:1-3; 12:11; 13:8; 12:19-14; 5; 19:7-22; 22:16-24; 26:210).

Thiokol had some of the most sophisticated testing equip-

ment in the world at their disposal. (Exh. 69). There were no
problems of privity with the manufacturer.
Attempts by Thiokol to alter the doctrine of strict liability to try to recover should not be allowed.

POINT IX:

PALMER IS NOT A MERCHANT UNDER THE UCC.

70A-2-104 defines a merchant for purposes of determining
whether or not the UCC applies to that party.

Merchant means:

A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved . . .
U.C.A. 70A-2-104(l).
Palmer is a plumbing/mechanical contractor who has never
held itself out as a fiberglass tank manufacturer.

All parties

involved in this case knew that a separate contract would have to
be entered into with a fiberglass manufacturer.

Palmer is not

one who "dcaals in goods of the kind," nor did Palmer hold itself
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out as dealing in goods of that kind, nor having knowledge or
skill peculiar to those goods.

POINT X: THE TANKS IN QUESTION ARE NOT GOODS UNDER THE UCC
BECAUSE NOT MOVEABLE.
U.C.A. 70A-2-105(l) defines goods as things which "are
moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale."
The tanks themselves were not so. The UCC was designed to cover
moveable goods, not pre-fab constructions as the tanks in questionf shipped in panels, then permanently joined and affixed to a
specially designed concrete keyway.
In Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Assoc, 657 P.2d
1279 (Utah 1982), the court considered how to determine a fixture
for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute. The court held that
because certain whey drying equipment was intended by the owner
to be moved in and out of the building, it was personal property.
In the present case, the tanks in question were permanently
attached to concrete by bolts every foot, then covered with
grout.

The tanks in question were pre-fab construction of real

property not covered by the UCC.

CONCLUSION
Thiokol's Brief challenges the Findings of Fact without
appropriately marshalling the evidence in demonstrating to this
court that the evidence as marshalled is legally insufficient to
support the finding.

Therefore, the Findings must stand.
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The

Conclusions drawn by the trial court are sustainable as based
upon the Findings of Fact,
Thiokol's position on appeal must fail.

Thiokol attempts to

create negligence and fault issues in the trial court's decision
where there are in fact no such issues.

Thiokol would like this

court to rewrite the specifications for the tanks clearer and
better than they did in the contract with Interwest.
court appropriately refused that urging from Thiokol.

The trial
Thiokol

got what th€>y specified and should not now be heard to complain.
When warned to discard the tanks, Thiokol refused.

When

warned, at the least, to do some simple testing, Thiokol refused.
Thiokol's knowledgeable acceptance

of possibly

deficient

tanks

assumed the risk of failure.
Thiokol would have this Court ignore their installation of
the pumps as a substantial modification while claiming that they
have the right to revoke the acceptance and sue for breach.
Lastly Thiokol asks this Court to consider theories other than
contract for the resolution of this case, including the imposition of higher than contract standards or strict liability upon
the manufacturer of the tanks, and that without even addressing
the issues created by their modifications.

All in the absence of

evidence showing that the tanks were dangerous had they been used
as specifi€*d.

Thiokol must fail.

The trial court correctly found and the evidence reflects
that this is a contract case governed by contract principles.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
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THIS MATTER WAS SUBMITTED to the Court on post-trial briefs
for Memorandum Decision. After having reviewed at length the
pleadings, memoranda, depositions, the Court's own notes and
the exhibits offered at trial this Court holds, primarily for
reasons set forth in Palmer's and Interwest's post trial
briefs, against Thiokol and in favor of Interwest and Palmer
and Fiberglass Structures. Although it is inviting to write a
lengthy Memorandum Decision addressing each of the numerous
factual and legal issues raised, this Court declines to do so.
Each of the issues addressed in the post-trial briefs may merit
attention, but the parties' attention is directed to the issues
argued and in the order found in post trial brief filed by
Palmer. The Court's holding is consistent with the positions
taken therein and in addition to a few comments which may here
be appropriate.
Again, without addressing each of the legal and factual
issues raised in the trial and explored in the various post
trial briefs, this Court would find that Thiokol has failed to
show conclusively or even to a preponderance of the evidence
the reason for the failure of the tanks. This Court noted
early on that the cause of the failure was the key issue upon
which all other issues in this case turned. The reason for the
failure has not been demonstrated to this Court's satisfaction
to be a result of noncompliance, by the Defendants, with the
terms and provisions of the contract.
Generally speaking and to be addressed more particularly
later, this Court finds that the contract, prepared and drafted
by Thiokol, was neither specific or sufficiently clear to
require certain performance of which Thiokol now complains.
Specifically and only by way of example, the Court does not
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find that the contract and specifications required the safety
factor of ten (10) nor a certain wall thickness. Moreover it
was not shown that Fiberglass Structures, Interwest or Palmer
failed to comply with the provisions of the contract in any way
which caused or resulted in the failure.
Additionally, this Court finds that many of the principles
of law suggested to be applicable by Thiokol do not apply in
this case, as after the first failure the parties in large
measure modified their relationship with one another in the
contract and Thiokol undertook a new relationship with the
other parties in engineering and supervising the modification
and completion of the tanks in question. Further, that if any
failure to comply with the terms and provisions of the contract
occurred, such failure was encouraged, accepted and waived by
Thiokol. What deficiencies there may have been in the tanks
was as well or better known to Thiokol than to any of the other
parties
including
Fiberglass
Structures.
But
those
deficiencies, whatever thev were, have not been shown to be the
cause of failure.
The Court further finds that the claim by Thiokol for
replacement of the tanks was excessive.
Thiokol did not
replace three contracted tanks with similar products, but
rather with far more costly products. The cost for clean up,
response, down time, overhead, etc. were not only excessive and
not properly mitigated, but also unsubstantiated.
Nor were
most of them necessarily, naturally and consequentially flowing
from the fault, if any, by the other parties, but in fact
flowed from action by Thiokol itself. In addition, most of
those damages could not have been reasonably foreseen and were
not, at the time the contract was entered into or during the
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completion stage of the contract, within the reasonable
contemplation or expectation of the parties thereto•
As to the warranty provisions themselves, if in fact they
were binding upon the parties, would be limited to the cost of
the replacement of the tanks themselves at the contract price.
CAUSES OF FAILURE
Much evidence and testimony was received relative to the
cause of the failure of the tank.
Testimony was that
Fiberglass Structures failed to properly design and engineer
the tanks, failed to sufficiently overlap the woven roving,
failed to use the specified resin, failed to make the wall
thickness and tensile strength sufficient, failed to conduct
proper testing and that all of the above contributed to the
failure.
Testimony more specifically was that the hoop
stresses were so great on a tank completely filled, that the
wall strength was insufficient to withstand.
There was
contrary testimony however, that there was sufficient tensile
strength to withstand the hoop stresses anticipated (though
perhaps not to a safety factor of ten). The coupon test of the
segments near or similar to where the break occurred were in
this Court's mind inconclusive.
Overlapping of the woven
roving, as indicated on the coupon test was inappropriately
controlled and in fact though the coupon test may reveal mass,
weight, composition, etc., there is some question about the
accuracy of the overlapping of the woven roving as it was
disclosed in the coupons. Insufficient testimony was given to
this Court with respect to the controls placed thereon and in
fact a close review of the the coupons indicate that there had
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been a shift in the woven roving during or after testing at the
overlap area when the length of the coupon is measured against
the length of the segment from which it was taken.
Much also has been said relative to the change in the
method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead
feed. Though that is a substantial change which in and of
itself may void any warranties given, the Court was not
persuaded that that change without more resulted in the
failure. The evidence of vibration or trauma to the tanks from
the overhead filling was, to this Court, insufficiently
persuasive to indicate that it was a causative factor.
The overhead filling method did however allow for over
filling of the tank, which this Court finds was the most likely
cause of the failure, and such over filling would not have
occurred had the gravity feed system remained in place.
In that connection, testimony persuasive to the Court, was
that the most likely cause of the failure was the over filling
of the tank causing uplift which the tank was not designed to
withstand. The Court is unconvinced from the testimony of the
technicians from Thiokol that over filling did not occur. In
order to believe that over filling did not occur, this Court
would have to believe that the pumps were turned off just
minutes before the rupture occurred.
The testimony with
respect to the same was unconvincing and in this Court's mind
incredible. Most likely the facts were that the tank was over
filled and had been over filling for some time prior to its
discovery, causing an uplift, rupturing the bottom of the tank
which went up the side of the tank causing the entire failure.
This Court is simply not persuaded given the pumping capacity
that the space along the top of the tank would be sufficient to
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allow escape of the fluid with sufficient speed to eliminate
the uplift pressures at the bottom of the tank.
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
There has been much testimony and controversy as to whether
the tanks were built pursuant to the design specification.
This Court would find that they in fact were. There is little
question, however, that the tanks were under-designed, that
they did not have sufficient hoop or tensile strength and
likely may have eventually failed in any regard. Having so
found an explanation is needed. This Court does not find that
NBS/PS 15-69 standards were incorporated with sufficient
clarity for the designer to be aware of their application and
specifically with respect to wall thickness
and safety
factors. The Thomas report addressed these very issues to some
degree and testimony from the stand elaborated thereon. The
Court is not convinced that the specifications included those
standards for the reasons argued by Interwest and Palmer. The
Court is however under the opinion that manufactures of tanks
such as this (as well as Thiokol) in all likelihood should have
been aware of the need for higher standards as applied to both
wall thickness, woven roving overlapping and safety factors.
The fact remains that Thiokol knew of the wall thickness or
lack thereof and of the safety concerns and accepted the
product anyway. Whatever deficiencies there may have been were
fully accepted by Thiokol.
TORT - CONTRACT
This case is entirely controlled by contract.

The
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principles of tort law do not have application and will not be
considered. The parties agreed between themselves by contract
as to what duties were being undertaken, what liability and
damages as a result of the breach would apply. That finding
and conclusion eliminates a number of claims between each of
the parties and specifically as against Mr. John Rysgarrd
personally. Thiokol's claims therein are denied.
Without going through all of the provisions of the
contract, this Court finds, as argued by Palmer, that after the
first failure "Thiokol undertook" and became very much involved
in
the
new
plans
specifications,
acceptance,
design,
implementation, and construction of the new tanks. In large
measure under Thiokol*s supervision, the parties jointly
constructed the tanks. Thiokol accepted them and the engineer
placed his stamp of approval on the same. In like measure
Interwest and Palmer were in large degree "left out of the
loop" and being left out of the loop is one of the very reasons
Thiokol is finding itself directly in the liability loop.
After completion and in addition to the above, the action taken
by Thiokol to modify the filling mechanism and the over filling
was Thiokol alone.
WARRANTY
Much has been argued and plead with respect to the warranty
provisions by Palmer, Interwest and Fiberglass Construction.
Arguments have been heard relative to duration, implementation,
consideration
(expressed
and
implied),
and
remedies.
Warranties were given.
Consideration existed even though
payment was not made and has never been made in full for the
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tanks.
The
limitations, however, on the warranty are
significant and this Court finds that the obligations under the
warranties would be to simply and only replace the tanks
involved. The Court would find that all three (3) tanks of
necessity would have to be replaced, the cost of the same being
approximately $80,000.00.
The failure, however was not a
warranty matter and no claim thereunder is therefor appropriate.
CONTRACT AND REMEDIES
Ambiguities in the contract are to be resolved against
Thiokol. As to warranty, the Court finds that that is a
contractual matter.
Principles of comparative fault would
apply in the warranty field but action by Thiokol in this case
bars recovery.
There is some issue with respect as to whether Interwest,
Palmer, or Fiberglass were given the adequate opportunity to
remedy the alleged breach after the failure. Whether that time
was sufficient between the failure and when Thiokol contracted
to have another supplier replace the tanks is uncertain. This
Court finds that it is not dispositive of the issue and in any
event the Court would limit the damages to $80,000.00 in any
event.
UCC
There has been much argument with
respect to the
application of the UCC. The parties here are contractors not
suppliers or merchants as contemplated within the Uniform
Commercial Code language and therefore provisions of the same
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Palmer

are not directly applicable.
JUDGMENT
Interwest is
$229,000.00 plus
awarded Judgment
plus 10% interest

awarded Judgment against Thiokol in the sum of
10% interest from May 2, 1989. Palmer is
against Interwest in the sum of $93,673.70
from the same date.
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Each party claims, from provisions of the contract, that
attorney's fees are to be awarded. Consistent with the Court's
earlier finding of fault in this matter and breach of contract
connected therewith, attorney's fees are to be awarded to
Interwest on its claim for the $229,000.99 and to Palmers on
its claim to $93,673.70. Affidavit and memoranda are invited
on the issue.
Dated the 1st day of May, 19!

Gordon J. Low
istrict Court Judge

A A

TabB

i p. r * :

Robert R. Wallace
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George W. Preston
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-3551
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third Party Plaintiffs
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION,
a Utah corporation

•

*

Plaintiff,

THIRD
AMENDED

*

vs.
*

R. ROY PALMER and VAL W.
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER
& SONS
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

•

*

R. ROY PALMER and VAL W.
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER
& SONS

it

Civil No.

90-321

it

Third Party Plaintiffs

*

vs.

*

JOHN RYSGAARD, dba,
*
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES COMPANY
and FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES
*
COMPANY, INC.
*

Third Party Defendants
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES AND
TANK COMPANY, fka, FIBERGLASS *
STRUCTURES COMPANY of St.
Paul Inc.
*

Third Party P l a i n t i f f

*

MICROFILMED

J.&^2z9£.
i+?f

Case No. J*

-

OCT 5 'W1*®

\y

vs.

*

THIOKOL CORPORATION

*

Third Party Defendant

*

THIS MATTER came on before the Court on January 28, 1992
through February 10, 1992, Plaintiff Interw€»st appearing and being
represented by its attorneys Steven D. Crawley and Robert C.
Keller. A. H. Palmer & Sons appeared and was represented by their
attorney George W. Preston of Logan, Utah and Robert R. Wallace of
Salt Lake City, Utah; Third Party Defendants, John Rysgaard, dba,
Fiberglass Structures Company and Fiberglass Structures Company in
Court and being present and represented by its attorney John
Daubney of St. Paul, Minnesota; Thiokol Corporation being present
and being represented by its attorneys Keith Kelly and Anthony
Quinn of Salt Lake City, Utah; and the Court having on May 1, 1992,
issued its Memorandum Decision referring to A. H. Palmer & Sons and
Interwestfs post trial briefs, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Interwest is a Utah corporation which maintains its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Interwest was, at the time the cause of action arose, and

is presently properly licensed to carry on business of a general
contractor in the State of Utah.
3.

That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer are sole general

partners of A. H. Palmer & Sons and are residents of Cache County,
Utah.

They are properly licensed to carry on the business of a

plumbing contractor in the State of Utah.
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4.

Thiokol is a Delaware Corporation with its principal

place of business in Box Elder County, State of Utah.

Thiokol is

the same as Morton Thiokol as it relates to contract documents.
5.
which

Interwest entered into negotiations with Thiokol under

Interwest

facility

known

agreed

to construct

as building

M705

a waste water treatment

for Thiokol.

The contract

consisted of a Notice to Proceed dated November 23, 1988, Exhibit
34, which incorporates by reference the terms of Thiokol's form no.
TC8000CREV10-87 which form incorporates certain defense acquisition
regulations.
6.

(Exhibit 35)

On or about December 1, 1988, Palmers entered into a

subcontract agreement with Interwest by which Palmer agreed to
perform

labor and provide materials

for the construction of

building M705 (Exhibit 37).
7.

Pursuant to the subcontract agreement Palmer was to

provide, among other things, three fiberglass waste water storage
tanks designated as T32, T33 and T34.
8.

Palmer originally arranged to obtain the three tanks from

Delta Fiberglass, however, Delta was unable to provide the tanks
because of a higher priority commitment to the Air Force.
9.

On February 28, 1989, Palmer entered into a Purchase

Order Agreement with Fiberglass Structures under which Fiberglass
Structures was to build and install tanks T32, T3 3 and T34 on or
before April 30, 1989.
10.

(Exhibit 2)

On April 30, 1989, tanks 32, 33 and 34 were tested with

water filled from a fire hose.
11.

During the test tank T34 failed.

Following the failure of Tank 34 the parties modified

their contractual relationship with one another. Thiokol undertook

a direct contractual relationship by commencing direct negotiations
with Fiberglass Structures in the engineering and supervision of
the modification for the remanufacture of tank T34 and the repairs
in accordance with Thiokol's specifications of tanks T32 and T33.|
The Court further finds that any failure on the part of Interwest,
A. H. Palmers or Fiberglass Structures, Inc. to comply with the
terms and provisions of the initial agreement between Interwest and
Thiokol, were encouraged, accepted and waived by Thiokol by virtue
of their direct negotiations with Fiberglass Structures.
12.

Under

Thiokol's

supervision,

constructed the replacement tank.

Fiberglass

Structures

Thiokol tested and accepted

Tanks T-32, 33 and 34, and Thiokol's engineer placed his stamp of
approval on the plans and specifications for the replacement tanks.
In a like measure, Interwest and Palmer were in a large degree left
out of the loop of negotiations and responsibility.
13.

On or about May 1, 1989, Thiokol inspected building M705

and notified Interwest that it considered M705 to be substantially
complete notwithstanding the rupture of T-34 on April 30, 1989 and
the necessary repairs to the three tanks by Fiberglass Structures.
(Exhibit 45)
14.

On May 1, 1989, Palmer issued a guaranty (see Exhibit

52) for a period of one year on Palmer's contract.
15.

As a condition for Thiokol's acceptance of Fiberglass

Structures' repair to the tanks T32 and T33 and replacing tank T34,
Thiokol required an extended warranty directly from Fiberglass
Structures.

On June 13, 1989 Fiberglass Structures gave Thiokol

an extended warranty for three years (Exhibit 18).
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16.

On May 2, 1989, Thiokol owed

Interwest the sum of

$200,000 which amount draws interest at the rate of 10% per annum.
That on May 2, 1989, Interwest owed A. H. Palmer & Sons the sum of
$93,673.70 together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from
said date.
17.

At some time after June 2, 1989, Thiokol installed pumps

to fill tanks T32, T33 and T34 replacing the gravity fill system
specified in the plans and specifications.
18.

On August 24, 1989, Tank 33 failed and released its

liquid contents.
19.

The

Court

finds

that

Thiokol

has

failed

to

show

conclusively or even by a preponderance of the evidence the reason
for the failure of tank 33 on August 24, 1989.
20.

The Court received testimony that Fiberglass Structures

failed to properly design and engineer the tanks, failed to
sufficiently overlap the woven roving, failed to use a specified
resin, failed to make the wall thickness and the tensile strength
sufficient, failed to conduct proper testing and that all of the
above contributed to the failure.
21.

The Court further heard testimony that the hoop stress

was so great on the tank, that the wall strength was insufficient
to withstand the stress. There was contrary testimony however that
there was sufficient tensile strength to withstand the hoop stress
anticipated but not to satisfy a safety factor of 10.

The coupon

test of the segments near or similar to where the break occurred
were in the Court's finding inconclusive. Overlapping of the woven
roving

as

indicated

on

the

coupon

test

was

inappropriately

controlled and in fact, though the coupon test may reveal mass,
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weight, composition etc., there is some question in the court's
mind about the accuracy of the overlapping of the woven roving as
it was disclosed in the coupons.

The Court finds that there was

insufficient testimony given to this Court with regard to the
controls placed on the manufacture of the tanks.
22.

The failure of tank T-34 on April 30, 1989 was caused by

a breach of warranty given to Thiokol by Interwest Construction
Company and A. H. Palmer & Sons, Inc.
23.
that

Notwithstanding evidence to the contrary the Court finds

the

tanks

were

built

pursuant

to

Thiokol's

design

specifications. There is little question, however, that the tanks
were under-designed, that they did not have sufficient hoop or
tensile strength and likely may have eventually failed in any
regard.
24.

The Thomas Report addressed these issues to some degree

and testimony from the stand elaborated thereon.

The Court is not

convinced that the specifications included those standards for the
reasons argued by Interwest and Palmer.

Th€> Court is, however, of

the opinion that manufacturers of tanks such as this (as well as
Thiokol) in all likelihood should have been aware of the need for
higher

standards as applied

to wall

thickness, woven roving

overlapping and safety factors.
25.

The fact remains that Thiokol knew of the wall thickness

or lack thereof and of the safety concerns and accepted tanks T32,
T33 and T34 with said deficiencies.

Whatever deficiencies there

may have been were fully accepted by Thiokol.
26.

The Court has heard substantial evidence as to the change

in the method of filling the tanks from gravity feed to overhead

001915

feed.

Though that is a substantial change which in and of itself

may void any warranties given, the Court was not persuaded that thei
method of filling without more resulted in the failure of the tankj
on August 24, 1989.

The evidence of vibration or trauma to the

tanks from overhead fillings was insufficient to persuade the Court
that the vibration was a causative factor.
27.

The installation of pumps and an overhead method of

filling the tanks allowed Thiokol to fill the tanks beyond their
capacity.

The Court finds that this was the most likely cause ofi

the failure.

The Court further finds that an overfilling of the

tank would not have occurred had the gravity feed system remained
in place.

The Court finds that at least one of the tanks was

overfilled on prior occasions. Tank T-33 had been overfilling for
some time prior to its rupture on August 24, 1989.
28.

The Court finds that the overfilling was most likely the|

cause of the failure which created an uplifting force on the tank
which the tank was not designed to withstand.

The uplifting force

then caused the tank to rupture at the base of the tank and the
rupture thereafter propagated up the side of the tank causing the
entire failure.

The court finds that given the pumping capacity

of the pumps and the testimony relative to the spaces along the top
of the tank and the man way that there was not sufficient area to
allow the escape of fluids with sufficient speed to eliminate the
uplifting pressures at the bottom of the tank.
29.

Warranties were given by Interwest Construction Company,

A. H. Palmers & Sons and Fiberglass Structures to Thiokol.
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30.

After tank T3 3 failed Thiokol withheld from Interwest the

sum of $200,000 from the contract.

Of this amount, $93,653 was

withheld from Palmers by Interwest.
31.

The Court finds that Thiokol is the author of the plans

and specifications of the contract documents as it relates to
Interwest.
32.

That Interwest and A. H. Palmer executed an agreement!

Exhibit 37 which provided for the payment of attorney's fees in the
event of litigation.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the contracts between Thiokol and Interwest and the

modifications thereto between Thiokol, Interwest, A. H. Palmer and
Fiberglass Structures were drafted and prepared by Thiokol and by
reason thereof any ambiguities in the contracts or parts thereof
such as specifications should be resolved against Thiokol.
2.

This case is controlled entirely under contract law. The

parties agreed between themselves by contract as to what duties
were being undertaken and what liability and damages may have
accrued as a result of breach of contract.
3.

The Court concludes that after the failure of tank T34

Thiokol entered into what amounted to a separate agreement with
Fiberglass Structures.
4.

The Court concludes that Thiokol negotiated

for and

bargained with Fiberglass Structures for the remanufacture of tank
34 and the repairs to tanks 32 and 33 on terms and conditions
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specified by Thiokol.

Thiokol bargained for a separate warranty
]

from Fiberglass Structures on the retro-fitted tanks.
5.

The court concludes that under Thiokol!s supervision, the

parties jointly constructed the tanks. Thiokol accepted the tanks
and the engineer placed his stamp of approval on the same.

In a

like measure, Interwest and Palmers were, in a large degree, left
out of the loop and being left out of the loop is one of the very
reasons Thiokol is finding itself directly in the liability loop.
6.

The Court concludes that the most likely cause of the

failure was the overfilling of the tanks causing uplift which the
tank was not designed to withstand.
7.

The Court concludes that Thiokol has failed to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the tank failure on
August 26, 1989.
8.

The Court concludes that the failure of the tanks was not

a warranty matter

and

therefore no claim under warranty is

appropriate in this case.
9.

The Court concludes that NBS/PS15-69 standards were not

incorporated into the contract by Thiokol with sufficient clarity
in the contract for the designer and manufacturer to be aware of
their application; specifically with respect to wall thickness and
safety factors.
10.

There have been issues raised between the parties as to

whether or not Interwest, Palmer and Fiberglass Structures are
liable under the theory of comparative fault as it applies to the
warranty.

The Court concludes that the action by Thiokol in this

case in overfilling the tanks bars recovery by Thiokol under the
provisions of warranty.
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11.
neither

That the contract prepared and drafted by Thiokol was
specific

or

sufficiently

clear

performance of which Thiokol now complains.

to

require

certain

Specifically and only

by way of example the Court concludes that the contract and
speficiations did not require a safety factor of 10 nor a certain
wall thickness.

The Court further concludes that Fiberglass

Structures, Interwest Construction Company or A. H. Palmer & Sons
did not fail to comply with the provisions of the contract in any
way which caused or resulted in the failure claimed by Thiokol.
12.

The Court concludes that Interwest, A. H. Palmer & Sons,

Fiberglass Structures are contractors and are not suppliers or
merchants as contemplated within the language of the Uniform
Commercial Code, therefore provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code as it relates to this case, are inapplicable.
13.

That

corporation,

Plaintiff
is

hereby

Interwest
awarded

a

Construction,
judgment

a

against

Utah

Thiokol

Corporation in the sum of $200,000 together with 10% interest from
May 2, 1989 to the date of judgment and thereafter at the rate of
12% per annum.
14.

That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer

& Sons is entitled to judgment against Interwest in the sum of
$93,673.70, together with 10% interest from the 2nd day of May,
1989.
15.

Pursuant

to

stipulation

between

the

parties

the

attorney's fees awarded herein are to be determined by separate
hearing.
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16.

That

judgment

should

enter

dismissing

Interwest

Construction Company's Complaint with prejudice against R. Roy
Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons.
17.

That judgment should be entered on the counterclaim of

R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons, against
Interwest Construction Company as set forth by the counterclaim of
A. H. Palmer & Sons.
18.

That judgment should be entered dismissing the third

party complaint of R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H.
Palmer & Sons against John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures|
Company and Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc.
19.

j

That judgment should enter dismissing the third party

complaint by Fiberglass Structures and tank company aka Fiberglass
Structures Company of St. Paul, Minnesota and John Rysgaard against
Thiokol Corporation.
20.

That judgment should enter dismissing the counterclaim

by John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures Company and Fiberglass
Structures Company, Inc. against R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer,
dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons.
21.

That

judgment

should

enter

dismissing

Thiokol

Corporation's counterclaim against Fiberglass Structures Company,
Inc., and John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass Structures Company.
22.

That

judgment

should

enter

dismissing

Thiokol

Corporation's counterclaim and cross claims against R. Roy Palmer
and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons, Fiberglass Structures,
Inc. of St. Paul, Minnesota and John Rysgaard
Construction.
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23.

The failure of Tank 34 on April 30, 1989 was caused by

a breach of the warranties given to Thiokol by both Interwest and
A. H. Palmers.

DATED this &

day of

W&ori J.' Low,
DISTRICT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following:
Steven D. Crawley
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 841012

Anthony B. Quinn
WOOD &' WOOD
500 Eagle Gate Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

John Daubney
1010 Degree of Honor Bldg.
325 Cedar Street
St. Paul, MN 55101-1012

Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center #50
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

Robert C. Keller
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place #1100
P.O. Box 4500j(
Salt Lake City, VT 84145

Keith A. Kelly
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
on this JJi) day of August, 19/2.
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Robert R. Wallace
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

to 24 2 30f.l'E

George W. Preston
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third Party Plaintiffs
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
(801) 752-3551
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
INTERWEST CONSTRUCTION,

*

SECOND

a Utah corporation
*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

AMENDED
J U D G M E N T

*

R. ROY PALMER and VAL W.
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER
& SONS
Defendants.
R. ROY PALMER and VAL W.
PALMER, dba, A. H. PALMER
& SONS

*

C i v i l No.

90-321

*

Third Party Plaintiffs

*

vs.

*

JOHN RYSGAARD, dba,
*
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES COMPANY
and FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES
*
COMPANY, INC.
Third Party Defendants
FIBERGLASS STRUCTURES AND
TANK COMPANY, fka, FIBERGLASS *
STRUCTURES COMPANY of St.
Paul Inc.
*
Third Party Plaintiff
vs.

*
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Case- No.
i w . ...

i \

THIOKOL CORPORATION

*

Third Party Defendant

*

THIS MATTER came on before the Court on the January 28 through
February 10, 1992, Plaintiff appearing personally and the Court
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now enters the following Judgment and Decree:
1.

That

corporation,

Plaintiff
is

hereby

Interwest
awarded

a

Construction,
judgment

against

a

Utah

Thiokol

Corporation in the sum of $200,000 together with interest at the
rate of 10% per annum from the 2nd day of May, 1989, to the date
of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 12% per annum.
2.

That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer

& Sons is hereby awarded judgment against the Plaintiff Interwest
Construction Company in the amount of $93,673.70, together with
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the 2nd day of May,
1989, to the date of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 12%
per annum.
3.

That Interwest Construction Company, a Utah corporation,

is hereby awarded judgment against Thiokol Corporation for costs
of Court in the amount of $
4.

.

That R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer

& Sons are hereby awarded judgment against Interwest for costs of
Court in the sum of $

, to bear interest at the rate of 12%

per annum.
5.

That Interwest Construction Company fs Complaint is hereby

dismissed with prejudice against R. Roy Palmer, Val W. Palmer, dba,
A. H. Palmer & Sons.
o

6.

That the third party complaint of R. Roy Palmer and Val

W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons against John Rysgaard, dba,
Fiberglass Structure Company and Fiberglass Structure Company,
Inc., is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
7.

That the third party complaint by Fiberglass Structures,

aka, Fiberglass Structures Company

and John Rysgaard against

Thiokol Corporation is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
8.

That the counterclaim by John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass

Structures Company and Fiberglass Structures Company, Inc. against
R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H. Palmer & Sons is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
9.

That the counterclaim by Thiokol Corporation against

Fiberglass Structure Company, Inc., John Rysgaard, dba, Fiberglass
Structure Company, Inc., is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
10.

That

the

counterclaim

and

cross

claim

by

I

Thiokol

Corporation against R. Roy Palmer and Val W. Palmer, dba, A. H.
Palmer & Sons, Fiberglass Structures and Interwest Corporation are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.i
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED JUDCMENT to the following:
Anthony B. Quinn
WOOD & WOOD
500 Eagle Gate Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center #50
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Keith A. Kelly
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
on this

Steven D. Crawley
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
John Daubney
1010 Degree of Honor Bldg.
325 Cedar Street
St. Paul, MN 55101-1012
Robert C. Keller
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place #1100
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

day of August, 1992
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